New Shades of Theology?: An Analysis of Bruce Ware's Compatibilist Middle Knowledge

“There is nothing new under the son,” said Solomon. Perhaps since Solomon lived in ancient Israel we are tempted to think that while there was nothing new for him, we’ve got lots of new stuff in our day. Thousands of years have passed since Solomon, and a lot has changed and a lot has been developed, so there must be something new. Well, whether or not there is anything at all new in the world I won’t attempt to answer here, but in terms of theological ideas there seems to be only a re-hashing of old ideas with slight variations for the present day. Such is the case, it seems, with the notion of “Compatibilist Middle Knowledge.” The doctrine of Compatibilist Middle Knowledge is, in its language, an altered form of an old heresy, but in its definition it is simply the same as the Orthodox Reformed doctrine of God’s omniscience; a doctrine that is old on two levels.

Defining Our Terms
Any critical analysis of a doctrine must begin with a basic understanding of the terms. Let’s start here by denoting what Compatibilism, and Middle Knowledge are. Afterwards we’ll explain how they work together to form the doctrine of Compatibilist Middle Knowledge, and conclude with an analysis of the doctrine and interaction with one of the primary sources on this teaching.

Compatibilism deals with the relationship between human freedom and divine sovereignty. Of course not all Compatibilism treats these two subjects. Some atheists offer the theory as a unifier for predeterminate naturalism and human freedom. But in the theological world it is a reference to the compatibility of human freedom and divine sovereignty. The Bible teaches both that God is sovereign, and that man is responsible for his free choices, the question remains, then, for theologians to assess how this can be possible. How can God be sovereign over all the world, and yet hold man responsible for what he does? To answer this question two major views have been proposed:[1]

1) Arminianism suggests that God, in creating human beings with a free will, voluntarily gave up some of His sovereignty. God did not want to create a race of robots who were simply compelled to love and serve Him because He had pre-determined that they would. Rather, He wanted a people who could freely express true love and devotion by having the power to choose either to love God, or reject God. This view of freedom is known as “libertarian freedom.” Libertarian Freedom states that “given the conditions preceding any voluntary decision, more than one decision must be possible- the person making the decision must be in a position to chose differently.”[2] Or as Bruce Ware Words it, “at the very moment of choice, we are free in making that choice if (and only if) in the choosing what we do, we could have chosen otherwise.”[3]

2) The alternate view is that of Calvinism. Calvinists believe both that God is sovereign and that man has a free will. There is a common misconception among people that Calvinists are fatalistic and that they deny human freedom; there is no such validity to that claim, however.[4] To resolve the apparent conflict between human freedom and divine sovereignty Calvinists propose the theory of Compatibilist freedom. Compatibilist Freedom states that we are free to choose what we want but that our choices are always limited by our desires. That is we chose what we most desire. Jonathan Edwards called it the freedom of inclination; we are free to choose what (and only what) we are most inclined towards. I will explore below how this plays itself out in the divine sovereignty/human responsibility debate, but for now let it suffice to say that Compatibilist freedom makes compatible God’s control over everything and my freedom of choice.

Middle Knowledge is a slightly more technical issue, but I will try to make it as accessible as possible. Middle Knowledge started with the teachings of Luis de Molina in the Post-Reformation period. Molina was a Jesuit priest, and to counter-act the “heretical teachings,” that is the doctrine of God’s exhaustive sovereignty over human free choices, he offered Molinism. Dr. Bruce Ware, professor of Christian Theology at The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, explains it in further detail for us. He writes:

Molina…argued that God has three logical moments of knowledge prior to creating the universe. God not only possesses knowledge of what could be, i.e., knowledge of all bare possibilities and logical necessities (what Molina calls “natural knowledge”), and knowledge of what will be, i.e., knowledge of all future actualities, or exact and detailed knowledge of the way the world, when created, will be (what Molina calls “free knowledge”), but importantly, God also possesses knowledge of what would be if circumstances were different from what they in fact will be in the actual world, i.e., knowledge of those possible states of affairs which would have become actual had circumstances other than those in the real world obtained (what Molina calls “middle knowledge”).[5]

If that doesn’t make sense, perhaps William Lane Craig’s lay out of the three types might be easier to grasp. In his book The Only Wise God Craig distinguishes the three forms of God’s knowledge as such:

1. Natural Knowledge: God’s knowledge of all possible worlds. The content of this knowledge is essential to God.
2. Middle Knowledge: God’s knowledge of what every possible free creature would do under any possible set of circumstances and, hence, knowledge of those possible worlds which God can make actual. The content of this knowledge is not essential to God…
3. Free Knowledge: God’s knowledge of the actual world. The content of this knowledge is not essential to God.[6]

Middle knowledge, then, is God’s knowledge of all the possible results from all the possible free decisions of all the possible free creatures, in all the possible situations. Now how do these two terms fit together? That is an important issue, and at the heart of this analysis.

Originally Molina argued for Middle Knowledge because he wanted to contend for both Libertarian Free Will and God’s Divine Sovereignty. By the application of Middle Knowledge Molina could allow God to foresee human free-choices and thereby maintain his divine sovereign control by working His will in light of that future free choice. But there are some advocates of Middle Knowledge today who wish to redeem this theory from the Libertarians, so they have adapted it into a Compatibilist form. Here’s how one proponent explains the problems with the libertarian model:

The problem for traditional Molinism, with its commitment to libertarian freedom, is that since there is no necessary connection between knowledge of each state of affairs and knowledge of what the agent would in fact choose in each different setting, God could not know the agent’s choice by knowing the circumstances.[7]

This assessment expresses one of the major critiques of general middle knowledge in a libertarian model. If human free choices are not determined by inclinations, then the surrounding influences upon a person cannot make their free decision certain, therefore making it impossible for God to know what that future decision will be. Despite Molina’s attempts, Middle Knowledge does not render libertarian freedom and divine sovereignty compatible. Here’s the adaptation offered by one advocate of the Compatibilist model:

What is different about this understanding of middle knowledge is that since freedom means that we always do what we most want, and since what we “most want” is shaped by the set of factors and circumstances that eventually give rise to one desire that stands above all others, therefore God can know the circumstances giving rise to our highest desires, and by knowing these, He can know the choice that we would make, given those particular circumstances.[8]

In the Compatibilist model, God gets to His desired end by creating the world with all the influences upon us that would cause us to freely choose and do what we wanted, but which was also in perfect concordance with His desired result. So, we see, Compatibilist Middle Knowledge reconciles both God’s sovereignty and human free will. Now that we’ve defined and explained our terms, however, it becomes necessary to evaluate the doctrine.

Evaluating the Doctrine
Dr. Bruce Ware, professor of Christian Theology at The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, has been one of the most recent advocates of Compatibilist Middle Knowledge. In his book God’s Greater Glory he explains:

One of the most perplexing questions that those in the Reformed tradition endeavor to address is just how God’s permission of evil functions in light of his eternal decree by which he ordains all that will come to be…It has occurred to me over the past several years that one promising answer to this question may be provided if a modified version of Luis de Molina’s notion of middle knowledge were incorporated, here, within a fundamentally Reformed and compatibilist model of divine providence.[9]

Dr. Ware appeals to 1 Samuel 23:8-14 for his belief in middle knowledge, a common text held up by proponents of all forms of this theory. The text reads:

And Saul summoned all the people to war, to go down to Keilah, to besiege David and his men. David knew that Saul was plotting harm against him. And he said to Abiathar the priest, “Bring the ephod here.” Then said David, “O LORD, the God of Israel, your servant has surely heard that Saul seeks to come to Keilah, to destroy the city on my account. Will the men of Keilah surrender me into his hand? Will Saul come down, as your servant has heard? O LORD, the God of Israel, please tell your servant.” And the LORD said, “He will come down.” Then David said, “ Will the men of Keilah surrender me and my men into the hand of Saul?” And the LORD Said, “They will surrender you.” Then David and his men…departed from Keilah…And Saul sought him every day, but God did not give him into his hand.[10]

The passage is the most commonly sited among advocates of middle knowledge, whether of the libertarian or compatibilist model. Dr. Ware, is right when he states, “1 Samuel 23 indicates that when God told David that Saul will come down and that the men of Keilah will surrender him into the hand of Saul, we know that this actually means, ‘If you stay here, these things will happen’ (i.e., this was an implicitly conditional divine prediction).”[11] This is obviously an example of God’s knowing what will take place under a specific possible situation. It appears very much to be exactly what Dr. Ware is claiming in Middle Knowledge. Another textual example Dr. Ware sites is Exodus 13:17:

When Pharaoh let the people go, God did not lead them by the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near. For God said, “Lest the people change their minds when they see war and return to Egypt.”[12]

Again Dr. Ware is so certain that this passage speaks of God’s middle knowledge that he states, “Here we have a clear and indisputable case where God used middle knowledge of what Israel would do under other circumstances in order to regulate what they would in fact choose to do.”[13] It certainly does appear to be a convincing citation; I am, however, now going to dispute with Dr. Ware’s understanding of it.

It is not that the author is wrong in his understanding that God knew how the Israelites would behave under a certain set of circumstances; he is correct in asserting this. If he is guilty of anything in his textual citations it may be perhaps he has an overly literal interpretation,[14] but he correctly understands what God is foreseeing about possible conditions. My qualm with Dr. Ware’s citations, however, has to do with his application of the term “Middle Knowledge” specifically to the generally accepted interpretation.

The traditional Reformed view of God’s knowledge agrees with much of what Dr. Ware has established. So Charles Hodge, great Princeton professor in the 19th Century, writes:

The knowledge of God is not only all-comprehending, but it is intuitive and immutable. He knows all things as they are, being as being, phenomena as phenomena, the possible as possible, the actual as actual, the necessary as necessary, the free as free, the past as past, the present as present, the future as future. Although all things are ever present in his view, yet He sees them as successive in time. The vast procession of events, thoughts, feelings, and acts, stands open to his view.[15]

Hodge holds to, as does Ware, both knowledge of the possible and knowledge of the actual. John Frame adds to this, saying that Reformed theologians believe that “God does know what every free creature would do in every possible circumstance…Indeed, God in Scripture often speaks of what would happen in conditions other than those that actually occur.”[16] But, he adds, and this is where we would disagree with Ware, “From a Reformed point of view, however, it is difficult to see why this kind of divine knowledge must be isolated as a third kind of knowledge.”[17] The issue comes down to narrowing the definitions. Note that natural knowledge states God “knows all the possible worlds,” while middle knowledge states, “God knows all the results that could come from those possible worlds being made actual.” What is the distinction for? Why is this narrow and nuanced understanding necessary. Even Ware himself recognizes the closeness of the two terms. He states, “One can think of middle knowledge as a subset of natural knowledge. That is, natural knowledge- knowledge of what could be- envisions all possibilities and all necessary truths.”[18]In a course lecture on the doctrine of God professor Stephen Wellum also confesses that the proposal offered by compatibilist middle knowledge is not that different from the traditional Reformed thought.

In regard to ‘middle knowledge’ the question has never been whether there is a conditional connection between future events, a connection known and willed by God. Rather what is rejected is the view of middle knowledge that incorporates libertarian freedom that is independent of God’s will and decree…So is it really necessary to isolate middle knowledge…from natural knowledge…and free knowledge? Is not middle knowledge tied to God’s necessary knowledge since it is God who knows what creatures and what creaturely actions are possible, simply because he knows himself.[19]

So why does Dr. Ware decide to make the distinction? What is his motivation? In his critique of middle knowledge in general Travis James Campbell has noted, “[William Lane] Craig has argued that middle knowledge may very well serve as the rapprochement between Calvinists and Arminians.”[20] We can see how compatibilist middle knowledge, quite possibly, could serve as a bridge between Arminians and Calvinists. It combines the middle knowledge theory, first advocated by Arminians, and the compatibilism of Calvinists. Such a comment needs to be taken into consideration when one notes the theological system to which Dr. Ware adheres. He is, himself, somewhat of a bridge between Calvinists and Arminians in so far as he holds to the system known as Amyrauldianism. This particular reform of traditional Calvinism is sometimes called “Four-Point Calvinism.” It agrees with the traditionalists on four of the five points of Calvinism: Total Depravity, Unconditional Election, Irresistible grace, and Perseverance of the Saints. The point of contention between the groups is over the fifth point: Limited atonement. Contra Calvin and the Reformers, Amyrauldianism adheres to a doctrine of “universal atonement,” that is that Christ’s death on the cross atoned for the sins of all men, but that only those who repent and believe are elect and thus receive forgiveness. The possibility of maintaining both a Reformed theology proper and an Arminian soteriology is made feasible through Compatibilist middle knowledge.

Let it be clarified here that this is not the exact confession of Dr. Ware concerning his motivations, merely my observation. I do not know the exact reasoning behind Dr. Ware’s move to include a third form of God’s knowledge, but it seems completely unwarranted in purely theological terms. To further critique Dr. Ware on this position one would need to investigate his motivations, and then seek as well to de-bunk his theory of “universal atonement,” something beyond the scope of this paper. But in conclusion it should be stated that despite Dr. Ware’s insistence on the “clear and indisputable” appearance of Middle Knowledge within Scripture, there remains no need for this distinction. It appears entirely un-helpful and un-necessary to use Molina’s theory, even in an adapted form.

Conclusion
Dr. Ware is an esteemed and admired theologian, a man whose work has been much appreciated and applauded.[21] And though he would offer his doctrine of Compatibilist Middle Knowledge as a new way to deal with the issue of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, it truly is not new at all.[22] Not only is it the reformulation of an old heresy, such that it is no longer heretical (and we are grateful for that), but in its full definition it is no different than the traditional Reformed theology. Nuanced though it may be, Dr. Ware has, in fact, not really offered us anything new under the sun.


[1] There exists more than three resolutions on this issue. Open Theism, a recent trend in theology, simply denies that God knows the future and therefore isn’t actually sovereign at all. See Bruce Ware, God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism. (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001), and John M. Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism. (Philipsburg: P&R, 2001).
[2] David Basinger, The Case for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical Assessment. (Downers Grove: IVP, 1996). 26.
[3] Bruce Ware, God’s Greater Glory: The Exalted God of Scripture and the Christian Faith. (Wheaton: Crossway, 2004). 63. Ware is not supporting this view in his work, he is merely stating it as its supporters would state it.
[4] The reader should dismiss any criticism of Calvinism that they read which begins by asserting that Calvinists (or Reformed types) deny human responsibility. An example of such a criticism would be Norman Geisler, Chosen But Free: A Balanced View of Divine Election. (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1999).
[5] Ware, 110. Author’s emphasis.
[6] Quoted in John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God. (Philipsburg: P&R, 2002). 501.
[7] Ware, 113.
[8] Ibid. 114-115.
[9] Ibid. 110.
[10] Quoted by the author on page 116.
[11] Ibid. 117.
[12] Quoted by the author on page 124.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Such seems to be the case with his interpretation of Matthew 11:21-24 (p. 118). In some cases passages where God is speaking of what could happen under a different set of influencing factors there is the possibility for anthropomorphic language. God is speaking of what he sees could happen as though He were a man, in order that we might understand. Not all are straight-forward, divine predictions. John Frame writes, “These passages, of course, are not intended to make technical theological points about God’s eternal knowledge. Perhaps we should not insist upon precisely literal interpretations. But granting the previous arguments of this book, it is plain that God, governing all things by His eternal decree, knows what each thing is capable of and what would result from any alteration of His plan” (Doctrine of God. 502).
[15] Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 3rd printing- 2003). I.897.
[16] Frame, 502.
[17] Ibid. 503.
[18] Ware, 110-111.
[19] Class handouts for 27360:The Doctrine of God at The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, January, 2006. .112
[20] Travis James Campbell, “Middle Knowledge: A Reformed Critique.” 6. http://monergism.com/thethreshold/articles/onsite/Middle_Knowledge.pdf viewed on August 24, 2006.
[21] See God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism. (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001); Their God is Too Small. (Wheaton: Crossway, 2003); Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: Relationships, Roles, and Relevance. (Wheaton: Crossway, 2005); and Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000).
[22] Among others who have experimented with it or who adhered to it are Millard Erickson, Christian Theology. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998). 385, and John M. Frame notes several others including Gomarus, Walaeus, Crocius, and Alstead (The Doctrine of God. n. 71. p. 502).